T h e I d e a I s F o r m e dT h e P l a nT h e P l a nT h e P l a nIdeas |
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As the new head of guerilla warfare operations, traveling about that spring Wingate encountered a discouraging situation. Visiting Army field headquarters, he learned from commanders that the shortages of men and equipment left little material for guerilla warfare. While the head of one of the Army Corp fighting in Burma, General Slim, expressed some agreement with him on guerilla warfare, he told Wingate he had no troops no spare as he needed everything he could to hold the Japanese. SOE ran an existing center for training British personal for guerilla warfare with the Chinese, and Wingate went there. He met the chief instructor of the Bush Warfare School, Major Michael Calvert, who was leading small raids against the Japanese. The two discovered they both shared a similar mind-set on the uses of raiding forces.
Ideas swarming in Wingate's mind as he saw Burma fall to the Japanese become constructed into plans. In late April Wingate found himself on the Joint Planning Staff at general headquarters staff in New Delhi, set up to create plans for the re-conquest of Burma. He realized that given the poor condition of the army and lack of troops, Japanese expertise, and the hostility of the lowland Burmese to British rule there could be no true guerilla warfare as in Ethiopia. Having thought deeply about the task at hand instead came up with what he called "Deep Penetration" or "Long-Range Penetration." This was the idea of an indefinite long-range raid behind enemy lines in conjunction with a regular offense but relying upon aircraft for support. |
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The new elements of warfare would be linked together and make possible in a deadly combination a force effective & mobile. Mobility as Wingate defined it was the ability to attack when desired and where the enemy would least expect it, and to withdraw into favorable terrain without being successfully pursued. Ground forces would engage in a war of ambush and raiding behind enemy lines, operating without being linked and restrained by conventional & vulnerable landlines of communication. Units would operate in columns small enough to slip past enemy forces, and big enough to inflict damage on defended targets such as supply dumps, roads, bridges, rail lines, waterways. Replacing roads and supply vehicles for the force, aircraft would land in or parachute in supplies. Air power would aid in reconnaissance & when forced to fight with a strong enemy force air power would provide close air support, replacing artillery. Radio contact was to be the tether between the land and air elements, directing the movement of air supplies and ground forces. Pushing for Action General Wavell was intrigued by the ideas and impressed by the optimism in which Wingate predicted success. Deciding Wingate should be given the chance to try out his theories with a brigade-size force he gave his official approval and personal backing. Wingate sought out and became a magnet to talented officers willing to think in unorthodox methods. One was Major Michael Calvert from the old Burma Commando school who had led raids during the retreat. He remained impressed by Wingate and his ideas on unconventional warfare since they met. One officer serving on the Joint Planning Staff was Major Bernard Fergusson. While busily working he noticed a, "broad-shouldered, uncouth, almost simian officer who used to drift gloomily into the office for two or three days at a time, audibly dream dreams, and drift out again"4 The only one among the staff there patient enough to listen to Wingate at first, he realized that Wingate was enjoying the attentions of senior officers. Beginning to pay more attention to him, "Soon we had fallen under the spell of his almost hypnotic talk; and by and by we - or some of us - had lost the power of distinguishing between the feasible and fantastic."5 Intrigued by the chance to see action while holding some reservations about his ideas of warfare, Fergusson fell sway to his enthusiastic willingness to bring the fight to the enemy. Like Calvert, he joined up and both were appointed column commanders. Others did too, ignoring the talk and gossip that many (including those not living up to Wingate's standards) were saying that Wingate's ideas were impractical and he himself was unfit for command. |
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Train Hard
By August a training center was established for his embryonic force, given the cover title of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade. He christened his new unit the Chindits, after a Burmese word. With the lack of well-trained troops in India Wingate had to take what was available. The troops were a mixed lot from 3 infantry battalions. One was an unenthusiastic British battalion having never seen action, older than most and used to garrison life & local security defense. Another battalion was a fresh but inexperienced Gurkha unit. Comprised of many new officers who were poorly trained, it was exposed to more senior officers skeptical of Wingate's abilities and Wingate's mission. The third battalion was comprised of veteran soldiers of the Burmese hills tribes (Karen, Kachin and Chin), led by British officers who knew and were comfortable with the land as their troops were. They would become the guides & reconnaissance troops, and Wingate regarded them very highly. Rounding out the force were survivors from the Bush Warfare School for demolitions, RAF signalers, and men training to handle pack animals. Initially disappointed in the quality of troops given to him ("The quality of the existing infantry is bad,"12 he wrote), he set out to prepare them for the brutal reality of jungle travel and combat.
The training worked to build up the fitness and competence of the unit. Loaded with 70-pound packs, men were pushed beyond limits they thought they could endure in the jungle, the fields and in the rains. Long marches and exhaustion were the norm, with those passing out revived & forced to continue. Sickness, minor injuries and heat were inconsequential to the tough standards of Wingate, who believed mind and willpower were the keys to much success. And who was following the same hard training he was ordering his men to do. With wasting time considered an indecency and officers carrying out orders on the run, "Both officers and men cursed Wingate as he drove then through the relentless weeks of exercise, but they admired him, too, and his very eccentricities made him more acceptable: he might be found stark-naked scrubbing himself down with a stiff hairbrush, consuming buffalo milk, or devouring raw onions, the virtues of which he was prepared to preach to all day and sundry."14 Men were taught that the jungle was a friend and that the Japanese were not supermen while fighting in that element. This meant teaching jungle navigation & survival, patrolling, column dispersal, air drops, marksmanship. Troops were trained to ambush the enemy & raid positions. However, Wingate neglected developing swimming skills which were generally lacking in the army. |
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Wingate's assurance, willingness to learn from the Burmese unit, and demonstration for his men’s concern created confidence. Sincerity and bluntness in speech commanded the attention of his men and gave the impression, "Wingate belonged to a different and older fashion. When he addressed his men he seemed to speak from a different world."19 To troops he would exalt about the importance of their training, his principles on Long-Range Penetration, and warn them that due to the danger of the mission some would not return alive. Rather then lower morale this increased it. Said one, "It was, I am convinced, the way his undoubted ability came over, and the feeling he gave that here was an honest man whom one could trust, and who would not let one down, if one threw one's lot in with him. "20 To many of his officers Wingate appeared, "An Ancient Mariner in speech, holding his hapless interlocutor with piercing blue eyes and a numbing fund of recondite information, given to harangues, quarrelsome of personality and yet strangely persuasive, he was the perfect image of the unconventional and unorthodox soldier."21 By the time the final exercises ended for the mission, "The men were not much worried. Their faith in Wingate was implicit."22
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The Send-Off Their mission was to be called Operation Longcloth. Then the original offensive plan was halted, the thrust into central Burma canceled by shortages and Chaing Kai-Shek's Chinese from the north backing out. The southern offense along the Arakan coast had already begun back in December. But by February it was bogged down with poor results against a numerically inferior Japanese force. Marked by poor British training, morale and leadership, one report stated, "the seasoned and highly trained Jap troops are confronted by a force which, though impressive on paper, is little better, in a large number of cases, than a rather unwilling band of levies. This cardinal factor, especially in jungle warfare, completely nullifies our estimated 5-3 superiority."25 |
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![]() ![]() Now a Field Marshall, Wavell had to decide on allowing the Chindits to continue on unsupported. The Japanese not only would be free to concentrate against it, they would have time to repair any damages to their supply lines, which would not be too strained since their forces would not be heavily engaged. His army commander originally supported the endeavor. Now he told Wavell he had to oppose the mission since any experience gained would be out-weighed by the loss from disclosure of introducing such a force without being part of a larger offense, and would create unnecessary casualties. But with his unit physically & psychologically primed, Wingate believed only under combat conditions could the ideas be tested. On February 5th, in a 2-hour meeting with Wavell he argued for the mission. Interested in his ideas & optimistic of its chances, "I had little doubt in my own mind of the proper course, but I had to satisfy myself also that Wingate had no doubts and that the enterprise had a good chance of success and would not be a senseless sacrifice: and I went into Wingate's proposals in some detail before giving the sanction to proceed for which he and his brigade were so anxious."26 Seeing them off the next day at the town of Imphal, Wavell stated to the men, "This is a great adventure. It is not going to be an easy one. I wish you all the very best of luck."27 The Chindits set off for the Chindwin. |
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1. Trevor Royle, Orde Wingate Irregular Soldier (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), 232. |