G r a n d I d e a sN e w P l a n sN e w P l a n sN e w P l a n sA New Strategy |
|||||
photo caption |
Wingate arrived back in London in early August. He immediately met with the Army Chief of Staff General Alan Brooke and then was whisked to the Prime Minister. Over dinner, Churchill listened to Wingate's stories of the Chindits and how given the resources and manpower Long-Range Penetration could help defeat the Japanese. Impressed, he wrote, "We had not talked for half an hour before I felt myself in the presence of a man of the highest quality. He plunged into his theme of how the Japanese could be mastered in jungle warfare by long range penetration groups landed by air behind enemy lines. This interested me greatly. I wished to hear more about it, and also to let him tell his tale to the Chiefs of Staff. I decided at once to take him with me on the voyage."1 The voyage would be to the Allied Quadrant Conference at Quebec in mid-August, where future Allied war strategy was to be formulated.
Allied strategy agreed upon called for a campaign to seize northern Burma in the dry season of 1944, "To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China."7 A new regional command headquarters, SEAC (South-East Asian Command), was established to control Allied forces on the India-Burma front. It would have a new commander in British Admiral Louis Mountbatten, replacing Wavell who had lost Churchill's confidence. One British army corp was to drive eastward from India into central Burma towards the Chindwin, while another attacked into the south. Led by the new army commander General Slim, their purpose would be to pin down Japanese forces and preventing them from operating against a northern offense. This would see General Stilwell leading an American trained & equipped Chinese force of several divisions out of Ledo in northeast India into northwest Burma, advancing down the Hukawng Valley to seize the northern towns of Mokaung & Myitkyina. A road would be built behind Stilwell’s advancing force through Myitkyina to connect to the northern part of the old Burma Road. A Chinese army would attack into eastern Burma from across the Salween River & seize this northern line of the Burma Road. Once the two forces linked up, the ground supply line to China would be opened. Supplies & equipment could begin flow to equip Chinese armies & fuel American bombers on Chinese soil. Wingate was to raise a force of six brigades & to cut the supply lines in northern Burma to the Japanese forces fighting Stilwell and the other Chinese force. Officially labeled 3rd Indian Division-Special Forces (but known as the Chindits), they would go in by foot & air. Wingate would command with the rank of Major-General. |
||||
photo caption |
Fighting for Support
Continued opposition combined with Wingate's ruthless forcefulness to create constant tension. Army staffs were furious at Wingate’s direct connections to the top and his abrasive use of this. They were livid that a regular infantry division was to be broken up to supply men for his unorthodox plan. They were irritated at Wingate's impatient demands for equipment & men. In response, Mountbatten’s chief of staff declaration painted a common view that Wingate, "He has extraordinary narrow views, runs in blinkers and can see no good except in his own chosen path. He has succeeded in selling himself to the PM who has that remarkable flair for choosing oddities just because they are oddities...he is resentful of anything that is normal, deliberately runs counter to authority, demands first priority for his affairs and if he thinks he isn't getting it threatens to wire direct to the Prime Minister."10 The command in India did not have a good reputation for military efficiency & energy, "The inefficiency & sloth of the Indian military bureaucracy has only been exceeded in history by that of the old Austrian Empire."11 Many who worked with him backed him & his refusal to be denied his ambition considering, "India Command was so notorious that nothing short of direct assault would have achieved anything."12 Mountbatten had to personally intervene to ensure the necessary RAF personnel and equipment were provided for the ground columns in the face of RAF opposition. As one summoned up Wingate, "The two qualities that made him stand out higher than most of his contemporaries were his vision and determination. It was these, aided by his intellect and advocacy, that made the impact on the great men of his time who supported him. It was these qualities too that upset many of his lesser contemporaries...The obstruction of petty bureaucracy was thrust aside, sometimes at the risk of insubordination. Defeating the enemy took precedence over such considerations as personal relationships & popularity."13 |
||||
photo caption |
The Indirect Gain The 1943 Chindit mission had a tremendous impact upon the Japanese, inspiring them to change their strategy. The Japanese army commander in northern Burma, General Mutaguchi, was a division commander against the Chindits in 1943 and had difficulty contending with them. Now as the army commander, he was facing threats from three directions, from across the Chindwin, from Ledo into Hukawng Valley, and from the east from across the Salween. The seemingly impenetrable jungle & mountain of the Burma frontier was no longer seen as a secure flank for the defense of Burma. He reasoned he must attack before the British did again using long-range penetration on a massive scale. As he described, "To cope with this difficult situation I thought that the best policy would be to strike from our side, before the enemy started his counter-offensive, and I planned, if the campaign made this possible, to continue the attack into India...I must say that the motive leading to the above decision was the decisive step taken by General Wingate when he moved into Burma."17 Mutaguchi believed if a weak British force could cross the Chindwin and trackless, mountainous jungle terrain, a Japanese force could infiltrate from northern Burma in the dry season & strike into India. Confident of the Japanese Imperial Army's ability to encircle and defeat an enemy not held in high respect, he began planning to cross the Chindwin and seize the British logistics base of Imphal in eastern India and decisively defeat the British. |
||||
photo caption |
Wingate conceived Long-Range Penetration as air & ground forces forcing a decisive result against the Japanese. His concept, "Using air mobility and air supply would, he argued, enable forces to establish a permanent presence in the enemy rear, deepening the main battle."19 With a large force, "Deep Penetration means the operations of regular columns of high caliber in the heart of the enemy war machine, engaging targets he is unable adequately to protect, and thus compelling him to alter his plans, thus causing a situation of which our own main forces are able to take advantage."20 As originally conceived the Chindits would remain light & self-contained, relying upon mobility & surprise to raid lines of communication & create blocks. He envisioned a block as a temporary base astride enemy supply lines, the location dependent upon the local geography and the duration upon the tactical situation. Wingate had foreseen a Japanese offense in January. He adjusted his plans accordingly with the notion the, "Only effectual answer to penetration seems to be counter penetration"21 An enemy offense would be to his force's advantage he thought, with Burma made more vulnerable with supply lines less protected & with more room for maneuver by the Chindits. With having to operate for some time deep in enemy territory, Wingate tried to balance the limitations of his force with the idea of fortified base positions, or Strongholds (from a Bible quote, "Turn you to the stronghold, ye prisoner of hope"). Located in difficult or remote terrain & thus inaccessible to enemy armor & towed artillery, they would be positioned near land flat enough for an airstrip for supply & medical evacuation. From these the Chindits could sortie forth to attack Japanese communications, returning for supply & rest. A battalion with artillery, wire & mines would defend. Support would come by 'floater columns' moving around the base ready to ambush any approaching enemy force, and from aircraft. Such defenses would force an enemy to attack in unfavorable conditions, making it too difficult to attack with anything below division strength. Preparations Wingate intensely trained his units. He, "drove himself and his staff hard, because he knew that you have to be hard, both mentally and physically, to beat such an enemy in such a country...He knew that his first duty to his men would be to see that they were well trained beforehand. He knew that the assurance of victory is the greatest gift you can give a soldier."24 Setting aside doubts over the future, in his speeches he tried to see to it his men were prepared, expressing confidence of the prospect of success and describing the importance of the new Chindit force. To Wingate nothing was impossible and though his standards were high his confidence and vision was inspiring. Stated one of his officers, "General Wingate was not an easy man to follow. By regular army standards, he was obviously eccentric, but he possessed that prized ability to inspire confidence in the minds of his subordinates."25 As one young officer in the audience at a lecture described, "He was the worst-dressed officer I have ever seen. The most remarkable thing about him were his eyes and his voice, which were as sharp as steel and with both of which he seemed to stab anyone to whom he was talking... There was something awe-inspiring in his certainty and his dogmatism, yet something which inspired the fullest confidence, so that one went away saying,' with him in command we cannot fail.'"26 Experienced officers from the first foray were given command positions, including Calvert and Fergusson who would each lead one of the 6 brigades with the rank of Brigadier-General. Wingate himself as a Major-General refused a higher rank when offered to him by Mountbatten, believing he should have to prove himself first. His ambition was, "to be the leader of such an expedition as would alter the whole tide of affairs in the most distressed and unhopeful British military theatre. If it was true that a great ambition drove him on, here, as elsewhere in his life, it was an ambition in which self played little part."27 |
||||
photo caption |
![]() ![]() The forces for the second Chindit mission were trained and assembled by February of 1944. The Chindits would again operate in columns of roughly half-battalion size. Brigades were reorganized into 6-8 columns each of 7 enlarged platoons (4 infantry platoons with one each of demolitions-engineer, heavy weapons, reconnaissance), platoons of 4 squads. Most of the men for the columns were regular infantry with some artillery & recon formations converted to infantry. Burmese soldiers for intelligence purposes were also attached, along with specialists such as medical and signal. The heaviest weapons were the machine-guns & mortars in the weapons platoons, with each planned stronghold getting several artillery & anti-aircraft pieces. The 100 odd mules with each column again carried the heavy supplies such as the radios, mortars & ammunition. Together the force numbered close to 23,000 men.28 Attached to each column were RAF signals section with pilots and signalmen for directing supply drops & close air support. Dedicated air support was available due to the presence of the U.S. Army Air Force No.1 Air Commando, led by Colonel Cochran. Created from the promise at Quebec, it was assigned to work directly with the Chindits as their heavy firepower & transport. The Chindits now had direct access to 24 C-47 transports & 225 gliders for transport, 32 P-51 fighter-bombers & 12 B-25 medium bombers for close support, and 100 light planes for supply & casualty evacuation.29 Four other RAF & two USAAF transport squadrons were also made available for the initial landings, as was a bomber squadron. In contrast to the standard RAF procedure of briefing aircrew before missions and not being able to communicate with ground troops once in the air, the Chindits developed a new procedure. Via voice HF radio fitted in the aircraft, pilots in the air could talk to pilots in the ground columns, bringing in air strikes with greater flexibility & accuracy. Wingate expressed deep distress to close friends after the first Chindit mission over leaving behind the seriously wounded & sick. He said the memory ashamed him and would always remain with him. With the means to ensure the wounded would not be left behind from the light aircraft which could land almost anywhere, force morale would be high. |
||||
photo caption |
Ready to Go
Three brigades would go in initially, the others to relieve them after 90 days. Calvert's 77th Brigade was to land first & was assigned the principal task of bottling up the railway & nearby roads in the Myitkyina-Mandalay valley. It would operate north of the important rail & road junction town of Indaw. 111th Brigade would operate south of Indaw, interdicting Japanese forces that might reach Calvert from the south. Using gliders in the first wave, half of Calvert's 77th brigade would go into landing zone Broadway, half to landing zone Piccadilly. 111th Brigade a few days later would fly in along with a force allotted for a mission further east, into the 3rd landing zone, Chowringhee. Broadway & Piccadilly were east of the railway valley & west of the Irrawaddy River, while Chowringhee was further south on the east side of the river. The landing zones themselves were open paddy & scrub land in areas with streams, surrounded by forest. American engineers would construct airstrips to enable the rest of the units to be flown in by transport aircraft, and bringing artillery for the strongholds & pack animals. A stream of cargo planes would ensure supply while lighter aircraft would be available to evacuate the wounded & provide forward supply. Fergusson's 16th Brigade would operate in the area west & south of Indaw to prevent the movement of reinforcements, hopefully seizing the town. Starting from Stilwell's flank in February before the others, it would cross the Chindwin to infiltrate through hills and forest towards Indaw. Both 16th & 111th would also be in position to interdict the northern supply lines of the Japanese forces advancing into India. All three brigades would establish a stronghold with an airstrip. Finally, a force of 2 columns with a small unit would operate east of 77th Brigade between the Irrawaddy’s branch, the Schweli River, and the Chinese border. They were tasked with interdicting the secondary supply route of the Lashio-Myitkyina road to the Japanese 18th Division, and the line to the Japanese 53rd Division facing the Salween. |
||||
photo caption |
|
||||
|
|||||
1. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol.V: Closing The Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 58. |