O p e r a t i o n T h u r s d a yS e c o n d M i s s i o nS e c o n d M i s s i o nS e c o n d M i s s i o nFlying In |
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![]() ![]() On the evening of March 5th, gliders stood ready to pair up with their tows and men began grouping up into loads for the airborne stage of Operation Thursday. Aircraft from both RAF and USAAF squadrons were ready at several airfields. But less than an hour before take-off the plan had to be quickly amended. A photograph taken on a last minute flight by an aircraft over landing zone Piccadilly was rushed to Wingate and Cochran. It showed Piccadilly to be unusable, covered by teak logs laid out by Burmese villages for drying out before use. Believing flyovers of the landing areas might tip off the Japanese, Wingate had refused permission for high-level air reconnaissance in the last weeks before the start of the mission. He also failed to employ specialized ground reconnaissance units. Cochran at the last minute had ordered an unauthorized fly-over. There were tense moments of discussion between Wingate, Calvert and Cochrane about if the plan had been compromised or not and if delay meant giving up the benefits of the good moon. The operation was hurriedly altered. The number of landing zones was reduced to two, and Calvert's entire brigade along with some columns of 111th Brigade would be flown into Broadway. Calvert preferred the slower build-up with just one landing zone over splitting his brigade up both sides of the Irrawaddy. With Cochran quickly re-briefing the pilots, Calvert gave orders for a change over of loads and passengers into the 61 gliders that would go into Broadway. Just over an hour behind schedule, the first wave of aircraft rose from their Indian airfield into the fading light. The tow planes in the dark led their gliders on a journey 270 miles eastward and behind enemy lines to deposit their cargo. Each transport towed a pair of gliders, to compensate for the shortage of experienced glider pilots and to get as many men in as possible. Overloaded by soldiers who had stored extra supplies onboard, some with terrified mules or jeeps onboard, the gliders were pulled struggling over mountaintops. Climbing to 8,000 feet to clear the mountains they encountered air turbulence. Together with the overloading of the gliders, this caused some tow lines to begin to snap under the strain. The rest of the air train proceeded onward. By the brilliant moonlight the first wave with Calvert and Allison (deputy commander of the Air Commandos) onboard could see Broadway as they approached. |
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Early Success
Columns assembled and headed toward their objectives. Six columns of 77th Brigade fanned out to the southwest to establish a block chosen where the jungle-covered foothills of a mountain range reached the railway. As one column each moved into the valley to block the north & south approaches to the intended site with raids, the other four led by Calvert made for the site near a village with some hills. The march was rough going for the men and mules, the trails leading over the hills and through jungle being poor. After six days, on the 16th they reached their target area and established themselves atop a cluster of small hills astride the railway and just north of Henu. The next morning they were action, as a patrol clash led to a larger battle. A Japanese force of several hundred reinforced rear echelon troops was counter-attacking the hills from the south, using a nearby unoccupied hill as their base. Approaching the scene of the battle with reinforcements, Calvert saw the Japanese infiltrating & decided quick action was needed. He sent some of the men with him around the hill while deciding to lead the others in a charge up the hill. He shouted there was going to be a charge, "So, standing up, I shouted out Charge in the approved Victorian manner, and ran down the hill with Bobbie and the two orderlies. Half of the South Staffords joined in. Then looking back I found a lot had not. So I told them to bloody well charge, what the hell do you think you're doing. So they charged."8 Heavy hand-to-hand fighting took place on the pagoda-topped hill, the "characteristic of this fighting was its savagery."9 The hill was cleared at the cost of 23 dead while inflicting 42 on the Japanese, with the retreating Japanese forced back with more casualties.10 The Chindits set to work to establish the block & with the aid of supply drops soon it was turned into a fortified defensive base 1000 by 800 yards.11 It picked up the name White City due to the number of parachutes adorning the drop zone trees. |
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Two brigades now had been flown in. A stronghold and block along the railroad valley had been established by 77th Brigade. The railway line north and south of White City had already been blown up in several places. 111th Brigade was deploying toward the valley further south of White City aiming to give Calvert time to fortify his block and stronghold. While four of its columns were landing at Broadway, two with brigade headquarters under Brigadier Lentaigne were diverted to Chowringhee. Two more columns landed there and headed east for their mission towards the Chinese border. And with Fergusson's 16th Brigade columns approaching the region, soon the Chindits would have 12,000 men deep inside Japanese territory and astride their supply routes to the north. Wingate in several communications with Mountbatten hinted at the possibilities of a greater achievement. Thinking of the possibility of cutting the supply lines to the Japanese divisions facing Slim in India, he proposed if the campaign started to develop favorably the reserve brigades could be put to use further south of Indaw near Meiktila and Pakkoku, near Mandalay. He wrote, "The establishment of the three Strongholds and the introduction of 14th Brigade may be regarded as a practical certainty, unless we in turn are prepared to accept defeat."12 Meanwhile, he proclaimed a successful beginning of the operation in his rousing Order of the Day to his troops, but in a typical misuse of signal priorities in which his messages were always marked most important he also jammed the radio lines for his units. |
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The Battle Picks Up
There were no contingency plans to oppose an airborne invasion. As a result, only local garrison and rear area troops were left to deal with the Chindits initially. Mutaguchi's more cautious superior in Rangoon, General Kawabe, recognized the danger to both Mutaguchi's division operating against Stilwell (18th Division) in the north, and to his main force of three divisions attacking into India. A battalion each from the 18th and 56th divisions, and two from the force marching into India were ordered into action against the Chindits. A few days later in mid-March Kawabe ordered large reserves to assemble at the town and supply depot of Indaw to deal with this threat. An infantry regiment based in southern Burma & another arriving in theater were sent north. Later sent in were several battalions of infantry & artillery ordered in from across South-East Asia. But Kawabe also refused to cancel the Indian offense. The Japanese response would pick up as these forces gathered under the newly created 53rd Division. Totaling ten battalions of infantry plus artillery, these were regiments, battalions and artillery batteries that were desperately needed as reinforcements at Imphal and Kohima. As Mutaguchi put it, "It was a matter of great regret and concern to me that Burma Area Army switched one entire division to cope with the enemy airborne forces, especially at a time when the provision of one regiment of the 53rd Division for the Imphal front might well have ensured success of that operation."19 With communications to the 18th Division fighting in northern Burma against Stilwell’s Chinese gravely threatened, with the growing danger from an attack across the Salween, being responsible for the main offense against Imphal, and now having to face the Chindits, Mutaguchi was finding his attentions divided & unfocused. He did not move his headquarters to west of the Chindwin until late April. Thus he lacked the battlefield touch of understanding the state of the fighting in India and, "liaison with the divisions involved in the Imphal operation was inadequate and resulted in alienating the divisional commanders from Army headquarters."20 |
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The first attack was put in by the Japanese rear area troops reinforced by several reserve companies hastily assembled from the 18th Division. This was easily driven off with the Japanese attackers not even making it past the wire. The Japanese then brought up several infantry battalions, and a loose siege began. Probing raids began March 19th to the north and south. Continuing over the next several nights, these started forcing the Chindits at White City to fight small, pitched battles. On the night of March 21 they launched their main assault on the northern defenses. Several times during the dark they rushed in, meeting wire and concentrated defensive fire from machine guns & mortars. Taking heavy casualties, they penetrated the perimeter and some close-quarter fighting took place. At dawn a series of counter-attacks supported by flamethrowers and the low-flying Air Commandos were launched, and the attackers were thrown back to the wire again. No.1 Air Commando was effective in its ground support role, with its quick response time and accuracy of its bombing and cannon fire. RAF men on the ground with voice contact would inform the pilots where the target was, and the attacking aircraft would come in parallel to friendly ground forces. Smoke would be used for marking by troops, and the bombings could be so precise as to be within several dozen yards of Chindit troops. By controlling air strikes from the ground last minute adjustments could be made. A column moved to operate outside the block to strike against the Japanese flank, driving them away from the perimeter. Air strikes were put in against the Japanese survivors on the hills. Repulsed with heavy losses, the Japanese suffered more losses from the air strikes as they retreated. At a cost of over 70 Chindit casualties, Calvert had held.21 |
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At Broadway Japanese also threw in an attack. An RAF fighter aircraft squadron daringly flew into Broadway and set up their base on the 12th. The first assault came the next day by air, the Japanese throwing in most of their serviceable aircraft in Burma into bombing the stronghold. Surprised by the appearance of the British fighter planes, they lost several aircraft. While bulldozers could fill bomb craters, eventually over the course of several raids the fighter squadron was whittled down and the survivors were withdrawn. While this was occurring, information was coming in from patrols of the Burmese infantry unit and the local Kachin people of the movements of a Japanese forces advancing on Broadway. With the small artillery and anti-aircraft units flown in prepared, the commander of the force at Broadway awaited with his men. The ground attack went in on the night of March 27th. Undertaken by a battalion from the 56th division facing the Salween River front, they were supported by several light artillery pieces. The night attack began as the force suddenly struck a company in position along the northern edge of the clearing. Furious hand-to-hand fighting took place and the defenders were overun, the survivors seeking shelter in the jungle. Seeking a way into the main perimeter in the trees on the east side of the clearing, they crossed the airstrip and launched assaults from several directions against the Gurkha defenders. They were beaten back and unable to penetrate the main defenses, the fighting continuing until daylight. The next day one Gurkha company moved outside the perimeter to put in a charge against the Japanese flank. While killing scores of Japanese in close-quarter fighting, they were forced to withdraw due to heavy sniping from the trees. The artillery unit emplaced on Broadway was able to destroy the Japanese artillery section. The floater column arrived to put in an attack but striking with only part of its force was unsuccessful. Two days later the column launched a more determined & reinforced attack with air strikes, forcing the Japanese to withdraw from their positions. With over 200 casualties (British losses about half), they retreated away from Broadway.23 Kachin guerillas picked off the stragglers from the depleted force. |
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Difficulties Mount
111th Brigade columns were heading for the area south of Indaw, the operating area to prevent enemy reinforcements traveling north against White City. With the Broadway landings proceeding smoothly, due to the fear of the Japanese air force discovering Chowringhee no more troops were inserted at there (The Japanese air force did discover and bomb the landing zone just hours after it was vacated on the 10th). Heading west for a rendezvous with his Broadway-landed columns, the two columns with Lentaigne had to cross the Irrawaddy. Gliders arrived on the riverbank bringing heavy boating equipment. With a single fighter piloted by Allison overhead providing cover, the force attempted to cross. As the day wore on, due to poor training & obstinate mules that refused to swim only half the men made it across. Not wanting to linger anymore during daylight, a nervous Lentaigne diverted the remaining column that had yet to cross to join Morris Force further east. He took the other column on & into their first action March 20th. But they were hindered by the cautious & nervous leadership of Lentaigne, who was not holding up well under the strain of command. Fearful of taking on the Japanese and hesitating to collect supply drops, little was accomplished other than lots of exhaustive marching. His senior staff officer had to persuade him not to send a signal to Wingate that inflated an accidental clash with villagers into one with strong Japanese patrols. The Broadway columns had to march a longer distance to reach the area, and one was ambushed & delayed on the way. Consequently the brigade was unable to establish itself in strength until month’s end to begin interdicting communications. They were too late to delay the Japanese concentrating reinforcements at Indaw. Three reinforced infantry battalions reached Indaw before 111th Brigade could began striking railway & roads. |
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Setbacks
As the tired lead column advanced on March 26th, it bumped into a Japanese outpost to the north of the lake. This alerted the enemy already prepared for them, due to a column of the 111th Brigade which passing days earlier had spread false rumors to the locals that an attack against Indaw was coming. This was part of their own deception as they headed south of Indaw, and they were not informed of 16th Brigade’s plan. Realizing their enemy would need water, the Japanese deployed accordingly. The two columns approaching the north side of the lake ran into Japanese defenses in a village along its shore and were surprised. A desperate round of fighting ensued over two days. One of the columns was able to hold off the initial Japanese attacks. Then enemy fire killed many of its mules, setting-off an inferno of exploding ammunition & flamethrower fuel. The unit slowly fell back under fire and after a desperate search found water. Its sister column was also halted by the Japanese, and the commander's decision to disperse and reform contributed to its disintegration. It was split up & suffered heavy casualties. The commander did round up some of his men & proceeded towards the other force further east. The rest were forced westward in the desperate attempt to find water. Upon reaching a stream some of the men & mules bolted across the open field in order to quench their unbearable thirst, presenting easy targets for the waiting Japanese. The column supposed to sweep in from the west had encamped the night before inadvertently along an unmarked road. A Japanese convoy drove through and in the confused fighting the column was dispersed. Further west, the column along the road leading west out of Indaw proceeded to block it. They made several successful ambushes of supply columns, taking out dozens of vehicles & easily fending off counter-attacks. |
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The Developing Situation After several meetings with his superior General Slim, Wingate obtained what he thought would aid his more ambitious plan. He heard from his chief of staff Colonel Tulloch that with the threatening situation on the Imphal-Kohima front, Slim might use two of three reserve Chindit brigades there. Wingate hurriedly met with Slim on March 21st. Wingate wanted to get his remaining units flown in, "before the rats got at it."30 He believed another Chindit stronghold should be set-up some 60 miles southwest of Indaw near the enemy supply bases of Pyingyaing and Pinlebu. It was through these two towns the two southern supply lines ran for the Japanese fighting towards Imphal. With forces operating here, they could easily interdict the supply routes and force the Japanese to withdraw from India, possibly leading to their destruction. Slim agreed to Wingate’s appreciation as it would aid his 14th Army beginning to engage the Japanese. Two of the three reserve Chindit brigades, 3rd West African & 14th Brigade, would be air-lifted into Aberdeen & White City (The other, 23rd Brigade, ended up being deployed near Kohima). On the 23rd, transports began flying in the first columns of 14th Brigade. Air supply problems were also rapidly increasing. The Japanese offense was causing the diversion of critical air transport units for reinforcements and supplies. Wingate sent a message on the 22nd to the Prime Minister asking for air reinforcements of four transport squadrons. As he was leaving his meeting with Slim, he said, "You are the only senior officer in South East Asia who doesn’t wish me dead!"32 |
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The future of Wingate's plan to help defeat the Japanese, and that of the Chindits, was suddenly dashed. On the night of March 24th, the twin-engine U.S. Air Commando B-25 Mitchell medium bomber carrying Major-General Wingate departed Imphal for a base further west. Along with the aircrew onboard were Wingate, his aide, and several correspondents. The aircraft flew over the series of forested ridges which lay beneath them. On the ground some forty miles west of Imphal several native tribesmen witnessed an aircraft flying in low from the east, on fire and losing altitude. It passed over their village, and after watching it disappear beyond a tree line a loud explosion sounded forth. The following day air search discovered the wreckage, and a ground party was dispatched to confirm identification. The impact & explosions had been so violent that the only items they found identifying that Wingate was on board were some of his personal letters and his pith helmet. All aboard had perished. |
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1. Michael Calvert, Prisoner of Hope
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), 28-9. |