MAPS & TERMS |
A N e w C a u s e A r i s e sS e t t i n gS e t t i n gS e t t i n gBackground |
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![]() ![]() Ethiopia in the summer of 1940 was an occupied Italian colony at war. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had brought Italy into the war on the side of Germany that June following the fall of France. Italian East Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia) presented a danger to the British war effort. The Italian position threatened the all-important supply routes to Egypt through the Red Sea. The British also feared a twin offense to squeeze Egypt, one arm from Ethiopia up through the Sudan and another from across Italian Libya. The Italians garrisoned their East African empire with some 280,000 troops, the majority of these forces however, native troops in colonial units officered by Italians. (16 Italian versus 108 colonial infantry & cavalry battalions1) This was larger than the small British forces in both neighboring Sudan and Kenya, and provoked the British into anxiety. Though Emperor Haile Selassie's Ethiopian armies had been defeated in 1936, an insurgency using guerilla warfare was active in land. These Arbenyotch, or Patriots, were doing their best to ensure a lack physical and psychological safety for the occupiers. Harsh Italian rule had sealed anti-Italian feelings following the conquest. In the northwest regions of Gojjam, Shoa and Tigre, resistance was strong. Italian garrisons were subject to raids and their lines of communication harassed, isolated garrisons were forced to evacuate. Weapons and ammunition stocks were low among the guerillas, but desertions from Italian colonial units and those taken from the battlefield were providing a regular stream. Instead of planned reductions Italian troop strength had to be increased for internal security. |
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A Change in Strategy In spite of British fears, upon the outbreak of war and into its first year the Italian forces in East Africa remained passive. The Italian command was mentally fragile and pessimistic. Pre-occupied with battling the guerillas and fearing a mass uprising, with a considerable portion of their forces committed to internal security they believed the British on the frontiers were stronger than they actually were. They saw their own forces were isolated from outside aid, without a supply stockpile for long-term offensive action, and lacked the resources to overcome their logistic vulnerability. The Italians contented themselves with occupying British Somaliland and launching a few raids against Sudanese border posts. Afterward, the numerically superior Italian forces dug in, hoping for an Axis victory in North Africa.
The Commander-in-Chief of Middle East was General Wavell. He was responsible for land operations in the Middle East, Mediterranean and East African regions. Together with Sandford he wanted Emperor Selassie in the war theater, to act as a magnet to rally support and increase resistance. Wavell and his intelligence staff persuaded Prime Minister Churchill to allow the Emperor to fly into the Sudan. Eager to help play his part in what he hoped to be the freeing of his nation, the Emperor arrived in Khartoum in June. Led to believe liberation was immediate, he was disappointed to learn of the miniscule amount of British aid that had arrived, and the restrictions on his movements. Instead of active assistance came local caution and a lack of interest. The civilian colonial government and local military forces in British Sudan opposed any actions that might provoke the Italians into making a military move against a very weakly defended Sudan. The Sudan military leadership under General Platt was pessimistic about the chances of any guerilla action seriously weakening the Italian grip on Ethiopia, and doubted Selassie's abilities. Dejected & questioning his allies' intentions, he began pressing for more to be done and appealed to Churchill and the Secretary of War, Anthony Eden. |
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Back in September, participating in a cabinet meeting discussing the Middle East and operations against Italian East Africa, the former Minister of Parliament and now Secretary of State for India Leopold Amery. He suggested that a Major Orde Wingate would be a suitable person to assist and lead these guerillas in Ethiopia. Having become familiar with him, he saw in Wingate, "a much more virile and solidly balanced Lawrence [of Arabia], but with much the same sort of power of inspiring others,"5 Remembering him from Palestine, Wavell agreed to this. A stipulation by Wavell was that Wingate was to be barred from entering Palestine. Wingate arrived in Cairo in October, assigned to the staff branch of military intelligence, MI(R). Arriving initially to Cairo with no official role, and aware of his ban on travel to Palestine, Wingate initially suspected the appointment as means to get him out of the way. To assist in the goal of aiding the Patriots in their role, Eden and Wavell had decided to create as the main force several battalions of infantry, to be assisted by small detachments of British-led guerilla units. The officer they agreed upon to organize and lead the training of the guerillas, and to advise & liaise between Emperor Selassie and Wavell’s command was Orde Wingate. On November 6th Wingate was dispatched to Khartoum. |
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1. David Shirreff, Bare Feet And Bandoliers
(London: Radcliffe Press, 1995), 19. |