A B i t t e r E n d i n gA f t e r m a t hA f t e r m a t hA f t e r m a t hThe Conclusion |
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![]() ![]() The aftermath of victory brought Wingate's mission and presence to a hurried end. After attending the funeral of one of his men, Wingate was ordered on June 1 to fly to General Cunningham's headquarters. There he was informed that Gideon Force no longer officially existed and that he was no longer a commander. Emperor Selassie had recently appointed his new government ministers without British political input. Cunningham believed that Wingate was going to meddle in the politics of Ethiopia, and he did not want him interfering with events in British-occupied Ethiopia like he had done in Palestine. Said one staff officer at Cunningham's headquarters, "Everybody at Force HQ distrusted him. He had brought the Emperor in. They wanted him out as soon as possible... they were afraid he would meddle in politics."1 Without praise for his success and without giving him a chance to give his regards to Emperor Selassie, Wingate was ordered to Khartoum on a flight back. The next day he departed Addis Ababa. The last of the main Italian forces were defeated in May at Amba Alagi, before the coming of the seasonal summer rains. British army and air force units were now freed up for needed re-deployment to the important front in North Africa. And the Red Sea was made safe for important neutral American shipping. Fighting went on though, to mop up the Italian remnants in the rugged northern interior region through the rest of the year. In November, after some hard fighting a mixed force of East African & Patriot force were able to subdue the final holdouts. In spite of their overall efforts, the Patriots and Gideon Force were left out of the official after-action praise. While ignored by the conventional army, the work of Gideon Force and the Operational Centers was not forgotten by all. SOE believed the experience invaluable and useful for later missions in Occupied Europe.
Thoughts Amid Despair Back in Cairo and without an official job, Wingate was told his rank had now reverted back to Major. Suffering from an outbreak of malaria, he was ignored and treated with disdain by a staff uninterested in him. It was June of 1941 and the war was in a critical stage in the Mediterranean. British forces in Libya had been driven out, the Cyrenaica port of Tobruk was under siege, and an offensive strike against the German forces in the Libyan desert was being soundly defeated. Crete had just been conquered with heavy losses to Allied forces following the disastrous British intervention in Greece. Allied forces were attacking into Vichy-controlled French Syria to forestall an Axis intervention, and meeting tough resistance. Other Allied units were engaged in putting down a pro-Axis revolt in Iraq. With these pressing concerns and strategic threats across the map, no one wanted to think of the side-show of East Africa, especially about what was considered the minor activity of Gideon Force. The Cairo staff gave Wingate a hard time on his recommendations for awards for his personal and obstructed his attempts to get hardship-pay for them as well. Angry at the indifference given to Gideon Force's achievements and Ethiopian political concerns, Wingate started believing the authorities were deliberately playing down his achievements. So he set out to write a report for General Wavell on Gideon Force. |
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In his paper ‘Appreciation of the Ethiopian Campaign,’ he outlined the success his force had achieved in Ethiopia, and what he saw as proper unconventional warfare strategy. In the writing he argued that a properly supported and led military unit operating against enemy lines of communication could be very effective in conjunction with the use of regular forces. Wingate proposed that, "Given a population favorable to penetration, a thousand resolute and well-armed men can paralyze, for an indefinite period, the operation of a hundred thousand."3 He asked for such a force to be formed and argued its effectiveness could be increased by the use of regular air support. He stated that, "To sum up it is proposed to assemble and employ a force of the highest fighting qualities capable of employment in widely separated columns; that it should employ the friendly portion of the population for cover and support… that it should be allocated an objective behind the enemy's lines, the gaining of which will decisively affect the campaign; and that to enable it to carry out its task it must be given a political doctrine consonant with our war aims."4 Thinking of the use of political propaganda to win over local populations, and as he saw it of British efforts to stifle Ethiopian freedom, he wrote that attempts to raise future rebellions amongst populations must be honest ones and should appeal to justice. He added for such propaganda to be effective, using Ethiopia as an example, "We owed this success to the fact the Ethiopians believed our propaganda... Righteousness exhalteth a nation."5
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While feeling depressed and a failure, in the middle of suffering a malaria attack, Orde Wingate attempted to commit suicide. His body racked with parasites from cerebral malaria, Wingate went to see a civilian doctor to get the anti-malarial drug Atabrine (Mepacrine). He was afraid if he saw a military one this would give others an excuse to relegate him to a future minor role. The drug can produce as a side-effect depression if taken in high dosages. This is what Wingate began to do to get the fever down. On July 4th he was running a very high fever of 104 degrees and was without any Atabrine. In a demented state from the malaria, combined with his already depressed state of mind, he felt such despondency as to become suicidal. He shut himself inside his Cairo hotel room. Stabbing himself several times in the neck he just missed his artery and jugular, and collapsed to the floor. From a room next door, an inquisitive officer heard the thud from the fall right after hearing the door lock. Becoming alarmed, he rushed in to find Wingate and apply first-aid. Surgery and a large transfusion of blood saved his life. |
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New Start
Wingate met with his old acquaintance Secretary of State for India Leopold Amery, and gave him a copy of his Ethiopian report. Impressed, Amery passed along (after he encouraged Wingate to edit out the most offensive passages) copies to the military Chiefs of Staff and to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. He also notified Archibald Wavell, who as Commander-In-Chief India was responsible for the Indian war theatre, that Wingate was fit and ready to resume military duties. In February of 1942 Wavell requested British Army headquarters send Wingate to him as soon as possible for unspecified staff duties. Wingate left London on February 27th for another war, in Burma. |
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1. David Shirreff, Bare Feet And Bandoliers
(London: Radcliffe Press, 1995), 213-14. |